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All scholars have their holy grail—that platonic ideal of
argument and analysis that lurks in the back of the mind, occasionally
bursting forth onto the page, if only to come out just a bit off, not quite
achieving what it had in its inarticulate form. My holy grail is likely
that of many a legal historian, or at least those who study social
movements and the law. It is to write history in which the
experiences, actions, and commitments of “ordinary people”1 as they
struggle to make sense of and improve the world around them blend
seamlessly with legal change. Such an account would capture the
ways in which social action external to established legal institutions
affects (or fails to affect) the path of the law as well as the ways in
which formal legal norms translate into lived experience. Lines of
causation and influence would run in both directions. Law professors
who are interested in such things talk about “popular
constitutionalism” and judicial dialogue;2 socio-legal scholars talk
about “legal mobilization” and “legal consciousness”;3 historians talk
about “bottom-up” and “top-down” accounts of legal change.4 Whatever
the field and whatever the terminology, all of this scholarship, in one
way or another, is concerned with the mechanisms of influence that
operate between formal law and the people.
The challenge, as anyone who has delved into this area quickly
learns, is to locate and persuasively explain the connections between
developments that take place at disparate levels, from the lived
1.
Such an awkward and imprecise term, but (a) it seems to get the point across, and (b)
other candidates—e.g., nonelites, local people, the people, the people themselves—are equally
awkward and imprecise.
2.
See, e.g., BARRY FRIEDMAN, THE WILL OF THE PEOPLE: HOW PUBLIC OPINION HAS
INFLUENCED THE SUPREME COURT AND SHAPED THE MEANING OF THE CONSTITUTION (2009);
LARRY KRAMER, THE PEOPLE THEMSELVES: POPULAR CONSTITUTIONALISM AND JUDICIAL REVIEW
(2004); Robert Post & Reva Siegel, Popular Constitutionalism, Departmentalism, and Judicial
Supremacy, 92 CALIF. L. REV. 1027 (2004).
3.
See, e.g., PATRICIA EWICK & SUSAN S. SILBEY, THE COMMON PLACE OF LAW: STORIES
FROM EVERYDAY LIFE (1998); MICHAEL W. MCCANN, RIGHTS AT WORK: PAY EQUITY REFORM AND
THE POLITICS OF LEGAL MOBILIZATION (1994); SALLY ENGLE MERRY, GETTING JUSTICE AND
GETTING EVEN: LEGAL CONSCIOUSNESS AMONG WORKING-CLASS AMERICANS (1990); Laura Beth
Nielson, Situating Legal Consciousness: Experience and Attitudes of Ordinary Citizens About
Law and Street Harassment, 34 LAW & SOC’Y REV. 1055 (2000).
4.
See, e.g., CHARLES M. PAYNE, I’VE GOT THE LIGHT OF FREEDOM: THE ORGANIZING
TRADITION AND THE MISSISSIPPI FREEDOM STRUGGLE (1995).
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experiences of nonelites all the way up to the decisions of those
officially empowered to make and enforce the law. This is hard work,
of course, and one can only do so much. Life is short. Pages add up.
For historians, archival research can be particularly time-consuming.
Causal linkages are difficult to demonstrate, strong conclusions
hampered by source limitations. Even if one is able to offer as full a
portrait as possible of some slice of the law-society continuum—a
grassroots reform campaign, say—and even if one can reconstruct the
details and institutional context of some legal development, the
connective tissue between “law” and “society” can be elusive.
Assumptions and inferences are required, and the gaps between
different spheres of legal experience become quickly apparent. Popular
constitutionalism falls back on a simplistic or idealized portrait of the
people themselves; legal consciousness and mobilization turn formal
legal pronouncement into so much background noise; history from the
bottom up doesn’t get very far off the ground, and history from the top
down gets stuck up in the ether. In short, creating compelling,
supported linkages between the various levels of the law-society
continuum, and packaging all this into a readable historical account,
is a formidable challenge.
Tomiko Brown-Nagin’s Courage to Dissent: Atlanta and the
Long History of the Civil Rights Movement5 is among the most
thorough and ambitious efforts to confront this challenge in the
literature today. It is an exceptional piece of scholarship—deeply
researched and richly detailed, written with passion and intelligence,
and filled with provocative, challenging material. It also well
illustrates how thorough historical investigation, coupled with
creative scholarship, can overcome many of the obstacles to writing
legal histories of grassroots social-reform efforts.
It is important to note at the outset that Brown-Nagin does not
fully embrace the holy grail that I outlined above. In some of her past
work she has engaged creatively and insightfully with legal history at
the “top,” including the development of constitutional doctrine.6 This is
not her focus in Courage to Dissent, which offers what she labels a

5.
TOMIKO BROWN-NAGIN, COURAGE TO DISSENT: ATLANTA AND THE LONG HISTORY OF THE
CIVIL RIGHTS MOVEMENT (2011).
6.
See Tomiko Brown-Nagin, Elites, Social Movements, and the Law: The Case of
Affirmative Action, 105 COLUM. L. REV. 1436 (2005) [hereinafter Brown-Nagin, Elites]; Tomiko
Brown-Nagin, The Transformative Racial Politics of Justice Clarence Thomas?: The Grutter v.
Bollinger Opinion, 7 U. PA. J. CONST. L. 787 (2005); Tomiko Brown-Nagin, An Historical Note on
the Significance of the Stigma Rationale for a Civil Rights Landmark, 48 ST. LOUIS U. L.J. 991
(2004) [hereinafter Brown-Nagin, Historical Note].
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“ground-level view of legal history,”7 a “bottom-up narrative” of local
lawyers and activists.8 Brown-Nagin’s interest lies predominantly in
the relationship among lawyers and between lawyers and their
“clients” (broadly defined). Formal legal developments are secondary
to thick description of the work of the African-American community in
Atlanta and the lawyers—some locally based and some affiliated with
national civil rights organizations such as the National Association for
the Advancement of Colored People (“NAACP”)—who sought to
represent them in the period from the 1940s through the 1970s.
In this Essay, I identify the key contributions that Courage to
Dissent makes to the legal history of the civil rights movement. In
examining Brown-Nagin’s important book, I also consider the
difficulties of writing legal history that engages with multiple levels of
socio-legal development. In Part I, I describe Brown-Nagin’s basic
approach and summarize the material she covers. In Part II, I
describe some of the key contributions Brown-Nagin makes to our
understanding of the civil rights movement. Finally, in Part III, I
situate Courage to Dissent among several other prominent legal
histories of the civil rights era. I offer some brief thoughts on this
book’s achievements and, more generally, on the challenges of creating
historical accounts that illuminate the complex intersections of legal
change and social activism.
I. THE BOOK
A. Methodology
“What would the story of the mid-twentieth-century struggle
for civil rights look like if legal historians de-centered the U.S.
Supreme Court, the national NAACP, and the NAACP LDF [Legal
Defense Fund] and instead considered the movement from the bottom
up?” Brown-Nagin asks in the book’s opening pages.9 Courage to
Dissent is an extended response to this question.
The answer, I contend, is this: a picture would emerge in which local black community
members acted as agents of change—law shapers, law interpreters, and even law
makers. Each contested and contingent step in the struggle for racial change comes into
clearer focus. One can only see this picture by looking beyond the [U.S. Supreme] Court
and the national NAACP and LDF, and examining developments in local communities
before, during, and after lawyers launched civil rights litigation.10

7.
8.
9.
10.

BROWN-NAGIN, supra note 5, at 433.
Id. at 8.
Id. at 7.
Id. at 7–8.
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Toward the end of the book, Brown-Nagin calls upon fellow scholars of
law and social change to expand their horizons so as to “include a
larger cast of lawyers and lay activists.”11
Central to Brown-Nagin’s project is the concept of agency—the
ability of individuals to exert some level of control over their
environment, including the legal regimes under which they live. She
seeks to “uncover[] the agency of local people in Atlanta,”12 to show
how “local people and unsung members of the civil rights bar actively
participated in the making and shaping of constitutional law.”13 The
levers of the law are moved not only by those who have been formally
empowered with the authority to make and shape the law, but also by
those who lack such authority—even those who might seem, on first
blush, to have little to do with directing the course of the American
legal system. “As important as national organizations and national
leaders were, local actors . . . worked to create the conditions
necessary to achieve change,” Brown-Nagin writes. “They played
leading roles in everyday struggles to ameliorate inequalities in the
social and political order. And they experienced the gap between civil
rights and remedies once the movement achieved formal equality.”14
Although the book insists that national legal institutions and
civil rights organizations should not dominate our understanding of
the civil rights movement—or any moment in history, for that
matter—these institutions and organizations retain a prominent place
in Brown-Nagin’s account, albeit predominantly as a foil for the main
protagonists. Her focus centers on the “tensions and synergies
between the national and local civil rights movements.”15 Judges and
lawmakers are relevant because formal law is a key component of the
context in which local actors—both lawyers and nonlawyers—operate.
But they are largely background characters. Even the national-level
NAACP lawyers, whose work is given wonderfully detailed
descriptions, are examined predominantly for the ways in which they
clashed with local actors. This is a story of intersections between
different groups of people, all of whom are united by virtue of being
African Americans struggling to inter Jim Crow. Beyond this
important point of convergence, however, their differences stand out
most prominently.

11.
12.
13.
14.
15.

Id. at 433.
Id. at 8.
Id. at 432.
Id. at 8.
Id.
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B. Atlanta’s Long Civil Rights Movement—In Three Parts
Brown-Nagin divides Atlanta’s “long” civil rights movement
into three periods; each receives its own section. The first section
examines the 1940s and 1950s, when civil rights reform in Atlanta
was dominated by a generation of middle-class black lawyers who
eschewed direct confrontation with the white power structure that
created and supported Jim Crow, favoring instead tactics of
negotiation, compromise, and incremental change. The second section
looks at the 1960s, when a younger generation of student activists
rose up to challenge segregation and other forms of racial
subordination as well as the older generation of black lawyers whose
tactics they felt were too slow and legalistic. The third section looks at
the late 1960s and 1970s. It focuses in particular on the work of socialwelfare activists, largely poor African-American women, who believed
aggressive school integration was the best way to secure economic
opportunity—a position that put them in opposition with Atlanta’s
newly empowered black political establishment.
The central figure of the first section of the book is A.T.
Walden, one of the leading black lawyers in Atlanta during the 1940s
and 1950s. Walden practiced what Brown-Nagin terms “pragmatic
civil rights.” This approach “privileged politics over litigation, placed a
high value on economic security, and rejected the idea that integration
(or even desegregation) and equality were one and the same.”16 On
questions of civil rights tactics, Walden often found himself in
opposition to the lawyers in the national office of the NAACP.
Walden’s commitment to voting rights stemmed from his belief that
securing political power was the surest route to racial equality. This
route might involve litigation, and there were certain kinds of
litigation campaigns that he enthusiastically and aggressively
pressed, such as attacking the white primary following Smith v.
Allwright.17 But courts were secondary to community-based
organization. Indeed, Walden was, in Brown-Nagin’s assessment, “one
of the most effective organizers of black voting in modern times.”18 Yet
his vision of popular political engagement was also limited by a strain
of elitism that led him to underestimate the value of mobilizing mass
political participation and prevented him from aiming his attentions
beyond the black middle class. “From the viewpoint of Atlanta’s black

16.
17.
18.

Id. at 2.
321 U.S. 649 (1944) (striking down racially exclusionary rules in primary elections).
BROWN-NAGIN, supra note 5, at 57.
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elite, many blacks were not yet ready to enter the respectable world of
electoral participation.”19
When it came to school desegregation, Atlanta’s black leaders
in this period favored incremental reform through political pressure
and negotiation with white leaders. Walden and the local black elite
felt they could achieve more by creating alliances with powerful
whites than by confrontational tactics, such as litigation directly
challenging segregated schools—a position that put them increasingly
at odds with the NAACP’s national office. This mode of racial reform
would look increasingly insufficient as the civil rights movement
gained momentum and as more assertive forms of protest took center
stage. And this commitment to biracial negotiation invariably put
black middle-class interests before those of the working class. Yet
during the 1940s and 1950s, the pragmatic approach led to some
important concessions by the white power structure, including more
black voters,20 more funding for black schools,21 and more housing for
black residents.22
Civil rights pragmatism, as developed in Brown-Nagin’s careful
analysis, defies easily categorization. It was hardly mere
“accommodationism,” as its critics labeled it. It had certain
characteristics that might be considered “conservative,” but it was also
notably responsive to local needs, and at times it could be quite
effective in improving the material condition of African Americans.
Consider, for example, the pragmatist approach to residential
segregation, which Brown-Nagin describes in a fascinating early
chapter.23 Whites who ran Atlanta were committed to keeping the
races apart, which they argued was necessary to maintain racial
order. The black elite by no means accepted this assumption, but they
realized that they could achieve more on the ground if they worked
with it. Civil rights pragmatists were basically willing to sidestep
direct challenges to policies that perpetuated patterns of residential
segregation in exchange for more housing opportunities for black
residents, who faced a severe housing shortage in the postwar years.

19. Id. at 58; see also id. at 255 (“Walden’s theory of black inclusion in the electoral system
rested on the ‘better class’ of blacks—the well-educated, the professionals, the veterans—fitting
into the system and playing the game, just like whites, but for the benefits of blacks. The
benefits of black representation, Walden believed, would flow to the black working class, whose
members naturally would strive to be a part of the better class. The question of whether the
poorest blacks would also benefit was not explicitly a part of Walden’s equation.”).
20. See id. at 50–58.
21. See id. at 94–105.
22. See id. at 72–79.
23. Id. ch. 3.
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They negotiated for more black housing, but did so by focusing on
areas that would not challenge the residential color line. This
approach did not sit well with the NAACP’s national office, which,
following the Supreme Court’s decision in Shelley v. Kraemer,24 was
dedicated to challenging the legal props of residential segregation.
Nonetheless, the pragmatic path offered readily identifiable benefits
to many in the black community. It responded to unavoidable social
realities, including “violent white resistance to black expansion,
discrimination in the housing market, self-interest, practical concerns,
and the limited success of LDF’s housing desegregation litigation.”25
Brown-Nagin does not defend this approach—its long-term
consequences included the tragedy of perpetuating black ghettos—but
she offers a characteristically balanced and sympathetic portrayal of
the pragmatist position.
The second section of the book examines the protests that
exploded across Atlanta (and much of the rest of the South) in the
1960s and the resulting conflicts between the younger generation who
led these protests and the established civil rights community. The
agenda of the young civil rights insurgents in Atlanta, most of whom
would become active in the Student Non-Violent Coordinating
Committee (“SNCC”), was ambitious. Not only did they target (with
much success) segregated lunch counters and other public
accommodations, but, by the mid-1960s, they also sought to expand
the scope of their protests to include poverty and urban slums. BrownNagin emphasizes that, contrary to recent scholarship that has
downplayed the linkage between Brown and the direct-action protests
of the civil rights movement,26 these actors were very much influenced
by the Supreme Court.27 The Court in Brown created expectations that
24.
25.
26.

334 U.S. 1 (1948) (declaring racially restrictive covenants unenforceable in courts).
BROWN-NAGIN, supra note 5, at 72.
See especially GERALD N. ROSENBERG, THE HOLLOW HOPE: CAN COURTS BRING ABOUT
SOCIAL CHANGE? 39–169 (1991) (arguing that the actions of the Supreme Court were of little
importance to the civil rights movement). Michael Klarman has also challenged the idea that
Brown served to directly inspire the direct-action protests of the civil rights era. In contrast to
Rosenberg, he recognizes that there were numerous “indirect” and unintended ways in which the
Supreme Court influenced the development of civil rights protest. Among these was the
unintended consequence of demonstrating the limits of litigation as a weapon of social change.
MICHAEL J. KLARMAN, FROM JIM CROW TO CIVIL RIGHTS: THE SUPREME COURT AND THE
STRUGGLE FOR RACIAL EQUALITY 368–85 (2004).
27. Brown-Nagin’s account focuses on the influence of numerous Supreme Court opinions,
not just Brown. In addition to analyzing the work of Walden and others to break the white
primary in the aftermath of Smith v. Allwright, BROWN-NAGIN, supra note 5, at 47–58, the book
details the impact in Atlanta of Gayle v. Browder, 352 U.S. 903 (1956) (per curiam), the decision
that struck down segregation in public transportation and thus ended the Montgomery Bus
Boycott. BROWN-NAGIN, supra note 5, at 122–30. It also discusses Boynton v. Virginia, 364 U.S.
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were flagrantly unrealized in subsequent years. The student protests
were, in part, an effort to demonstrate frustration with court-based
reform.28 They were seeking new ways to fight for racial equality that
would not rely on the uncertain and disempowering (for nonlawyers)
process of litigation. It was, Brown-Nagin demonstrates, frustration
rather than inspiration that linked Brown to the sit-ins and the
protests of this period.
Although one of the central developments of the early 1960s
was the students’ rejection of litigation, lawyers retained a key role
throughout this period. The NAACP and the students formed what
Brown-Nagin calls a “volatile alliance,” as each group saw advantage
in drawing on the other’s resources. Also, a new kind of lawyer gained
the trust and support of the student activists in this period, one that
was quite different from either the older generation of pragmatists or
the NAACP attorneys with their carefully orchestrated litigation
campaigns. One of these new kind of lawyers was Donald Hollowell,
whose uncompromising courtroom defenses of student protesters gave
him “mythic status” among the younger activists.29 Another was Len
Holt, a young black lawyer who, frustrated with the NAACP’s rigid
commitment to school-desegregation litigation, sought out new ways
to integrate litigation with movement activism. Holt saw himself as a
“movement lawyer,” using litigation as just one tool among many in
creating the conditions of social change. The courtroom was as much a
mechanism for mobilizing local communities—for, as Brown-Nagin
writes, “extending a voice to citizens shut out of formal politics”30—as
a forum in which law could be changed. His was “a bottom-up
approach to lawyering, one in which activists would lead and lawyers
would follow.”31 One of Holt’s most effective innovations was the
“omnibus litigation” strategy, in which a single suit would challenge
segregation policy in all walks of life in a particular locality, with all
public officials (including judges who ran segregated courtrooms)
named as defendants.32 This approach, which had considerable success
in Atlanta and elsewhere, was designed to use the courtroom as a
highly visible focal point for a broader protest campaign.
454 (1960), which struck down racial discrimination at interstate bus terminals as violative of
federal law, sparking a round of protests and helping to inspire the Freedom Rides of 1961.
BROWN-NAGIN, supra note 5, at 164–66.
28. See BROWN-NAGIN, supra note 5, ch. 6 (describing the origins and development of the
student-led protest movement of the early 1960s).
29. Id. at 250.
30. Id. at 200.
31. Id. at 188.
32. See id. at 187–200.
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The second section concludes with a chapter on efforts by
young civil rights activists in the mid-1960s to steer the movement
toward the problems of black poverty. Julian Bond, a leader of SNCC,
was elected to the Georgia legislature in 1965 with a call for a “new
politics” that would mobilize the neediest communities. This was a
politics, Bond explained, that would be “grounded in the hopes and
needs of the very poor.”33 Energized by Bond’s electoral success—as
well as by the effort by his new colleagues to deny him his seat—
SNCC launched a drive to organize residents of poor, black
neighborhoods. This chapter details the work of Howard Moore, Jr.,
SNCC’s lawyer, who fought in federal court to ensure that Bond would
gain his rightful place in the Georgia legislature while also defending
SNCC’s leaders against state prosecution. The chapter concludes with
the dissipation of organizational efforts targeting poor communities as
the civil rights movement fractured. “In addition to being overly
ambitious,” Brown-Nagin writes, “the project [of mobilizing the black
ghettos] did not achieve all of its high aims because it dissented so
much, in so many directions, all at once.”34
The third and final section focuses on the late 1960s and 1970s,
by which point the insurgents of the early 1960s had begun to secure
positions in Atlanta’s power structure. A coalition of black middleclass professionals and sixties-era student activists was now part of
the (liberal) political mainstream. Thus emerged a new, more powerful
black establishment. But just as many of them had made their names
by challenging the pragmatists of an earlier generation, now they too
were challenged, the voices of dissent this time being poor and
working-class blacks who felt their own interests were not being
recognized. At the forefront of their agenda was school desegregation,
a civil rights issue that had been relegated to the sidelines among
Atlanta activists for much of the 1950s and 1960s. Although NAACP
lawyers had been pursuing school-desegregation litigation in Atlanta,
local activists preferred targeting discrimination in public
accommodations and voting.
The relative lack of attention to school desegregation among
Atlanta’s civil rights insurgents in the 1960s carried over into the
agenda of those heading the new black establishment. They felt the
focus should be on ensuring black control over the schools. This, more
than racial integration, would lead to improved education. They had
the support of black teachers—a core group of the black middle class—
as well as the white elite. Black and white elites sought to implement
33.
34.

Id. at 257.
Id. at 302.
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a limited desegregation plan that would be coupled with increased
opportunities for African-American teachers and administrators.
Two obstacles stood in the way of this biracial agreement on
schools, however. One was the federal judiciary, which, after a decade
of delay in enforcing actual integration of schools, became more
assertive in the late 1960s and early 1970s. NAACP lawyers
capitalized on this new judicial attitude by pushing for maximum
possible integration.35 The other was the emergence of a grassroots
movement of black Atlantans, many of whom came from the lower
class. Poor African Americans stood by the integrationist ideal that
wealthier blacks had largely abandoned (if they ever fully accepted it).
The commitment of lower-class blacks to integration was thoroughly
pragmatic: integration was valuable because they believed it offered
the best way to lift up the most desperate of Atlanta’s black children.
NAACP lawyers and poor black activists, most of whom were women,
worked together in trying to convince the courts to adopt aggressive
desegregation orders.36
This coalition achieved only limited success in the courtroom.
The final chapter of the book details the history of Armour v. Nix,37 a
desegregation suit filed in 1972 by a group of mostly female, poor,
black Atlantans that would be litigated through the rest of the decade.
The state’s defense of its school policy played up the plaintiffs’ sex,
race, and class in an effort to delegitimize their legal claim.38 Not only
did they lose their case, but their lawyer allies often limited their role
in the litigation. Yet Brown-Nagin concludes that their involvement
constituted an important accomplishment in the story of the civil
rights movement in Atlanta. These activists made clear that blacks
had not in fact given up on integration by the 1970s. “[T]he case’s full
measure cannot be taken in terms of whether the plaintiffs prevailed
in court. Grassroots activists had never assumed that courts would do
justice in their cases and, consequently had never valued their
campaigns in strictly legal terms.”39
II. THE BOOK’S CONTRIBUTIONS
Courage to Dissent vastly expands our understanding of the
role of law and lawyers in the civil rights movement. In this section I
highlight three of the book’s particularly noteworthy contributions.
35.
36.
37.
38.
39.

See id. at 344–46, 348, 360, 363–73.
See id. at 385–91, 411–15.
446 U.S. 930 (1980) (per curiam).
See BROWN-NAGIN, supra note 5, at 413–15.
Id. at 427.
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First, rather than limiting itself to the more traditional story of the
1950s and 1960s, it expands analysis of the civil rights movement to
include the 1940s and the 1970s. Second, it highlights the complex
and evolving divisions among African Americans on questions of civil
rights. Finally, it draws attention to the role of class and gender in the
struggle for racial equality.
A. Going Long
One of the obvious contributions of this book is Brown-Nagin’s
decision to adopt the time frame of the “long” civil rights movement,
beginning in the 1940s and going through the 1970s. This choice
allows Brown-Nagin to present an account of the civil rights
movement that unfolds over time in all its fascinating complexity and
drama. The end result is legal history as saga: there is a kind of
intergenerational epic quality to Brown-Nagin’s account, in which
each generation of activists gives rise to new challengers who both
build on and critique choices and achievements of the previous
generation.
The dominant narrative of the civil rights movement, inside
and outside the academy, has long centered on its “classical” phase,
beginning in the mid-1950s with Brown or the Montgomery Bus
Boycott and continuing through the mid-1960s. In recent years,
however, historians have sought to expand the time horizons of the
movement. In her 2004 presidential address to the Organization of
American Historians, Jacquelyn Dowd Hall called for increased
attention to the decades preceding and following the “classical”
phase.40 By opening our eyes to the movement in a “long” perspective,
Hall believed a portrait would emerge that included more attention to
the movement outside the South and more attention to the place of
economic justice in the struggle for black equality. Much of the recent
scholarship that has adopted the long view has examined linkages
between the labor and civil rights movements in the 1930s and
1940s.41
Brown-Nagin’s account differs from much of the historical
scholarship that has pushed the starting date of the civil rights
movement back to the 1940s, in that she does not unearth the kind of
radical civil rights tradition that other scholars have found in this

40. Jacquelyn Dowd Hall, The Long Civil Rights Movement and the Political Uses of the
Past, 91 J. AM. HIST. 1233, 1234–35 (2005).
41. See, e.g., GLENDA ELIZABETH GILMORE, DEFYING DIXIE: THE RADICAL ROOTS OF CIVIL
RIGHTS, 1919–1950 (2008); RISA L. GOLUBOFF, THE LOST PROMISE OF CIVIL RIGHTS (2007).
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decade. To the contrary, in Atlanta the dominant mode of racialreform activism in this period was the pragmatism favored by A.T.
Walden and the black elite, a notably unradical approach that
embraced incrementalism and showed little interest in reforms aimed
at working-class concerns. Yet, as Brown-Nagin demonstrates, the
pragmatists did dissent from the legalist antisegregation campaign
the NAACP was pushing—in this way, they offered an important
alternative vision to the one that would come to dominate popular
memory of what the civil rights movement was all about. While not
necessarily a radical alternative, it was one that internalized certain
fundamental insights often associated with leftist approaches to
reform, such as the limitations of legal rights and the necessity of
political power.
The more radical voices, those demanding increased attention
to the most disadvantaged and marginalized of African Americans,
would emerge in Atlanta—but not until the 1960s and 1970s. BrownNagin’s decision to follow the course of Atlanta’s movement through
the 1970s allows for a whole new set of historical actors to be included
in the black freedom struggle. Many scholars have sought to make
sense of the civil rights movement in the late 1960s and 1970s, when,
in the face of white backlash and internal divisions, it seemed to lose
focus and momentum. Brown-Nagin deals with this challenge by
focusing on a single issue: school desegregation. The battle over
schooling in Atlanta during the late 1960s and 1970s encapsulated the
new landscape of civil rights activism in this period. It was a period in
which black political power was being realized, resulting in a new
iteration of alliances and divisions within the black community. It was
a period when integrationism remained an ideal, but one that was
often pursued for distinctly strategic purposes. The working-class
advocates of integrated schools judged integration to be the best path
toward improved education and economic empowerment. More than in
previous decades, members of Atlanta’s black working class were able
to speak out and highlight the disconnect between themselves and the
black professional class.
Simply by opening our eyes to periods of civil rights activism
previously treated as prologue and afterword to the main events, and
by insisting that these periods are just as central as the more
renowned “classical” period, Brown-Nagin has reframed our
understanding of the civil rights movement. In fact, one theme that
emerges from the tripartite organization of Courage to Dissent is the
continuity between the pressing issues of the 1940s and 1950s and
those of the 1970s. Looked at in this way, the dramatic events of the
1960s were both a culmination and something of an aberration. Our
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overemphasis on the “classical” period has diverted our attention from
the underlying continuities of civil rights activism in the second half of
the twentieth century.
B. A Movement Divided
Although division within the black community is not a new
issue, Brown-Nagin has gone as far as any legal historian in
untangling these dynamics during the civil rights era. A central theme
of much of her scholarship has been the persistent yet constantly
evolving divergences among African Americans on civil rights goals
and tactics, with a particular emphasis on the role of lawyers and
litigation in both creating and diffusing intraracial tensions.
In Courage to Dissent, Brown-Nagin offers remarkable
descriptions of a black community that was deeply divided over school
desegregation—a point too often overlooked in the historical
literature.42
African-American
ambivalence
toward
school
desegregation persisted throughout the period of the long civil rights
movement. Blacks were often resistant to the NAACP’s litigation
strategy, and the Brown victory did little to change this fact. Unlike
other issues of the civil rights era—such as public-accommodations
discrimination and voting rights—school desegregation did not readily
lend itself to protest remedies. The NAACP’s campaign was
predominantly focused on changing the law by getting the
constitutional right declared and then convincing courts to issue
orders to enforce that right.
African Americans resisted many other civil rights advances
that have since become iconic in the public imagination. Direct-action
protest always split the black community, a point that has been
explored in much recent literature on the civil rights movement.43
Atlanta was no exception. The Civil Rights Act of 1964, for instance,
divided black activists. Brown-Nagin describes a striking scene in
which the mayor of Atlanta, Ivan Allen, met with a group of twentyfour leaders of the black community to explain his decision to break
ranks with practically all other white Southern officials and publicly
back the pending civil rights bill. Most of the group were opposed,
believing it an act of political suicide on behalf of an issue best
resolved at the local level. (Allen ignored their advice and went on to
42. Notable exceptions include ADAM FAIRCLOUGH, A CLASS OF THEIR OWN: BLACK
TEACHERS IN THE SEGREGATED SOUTH (2007); Kenneth W. Mack, Rethinking Civil Rights
Lawyering and Politics in the Era Before Brown, 115 YALE L.J. 256 (2005).
43. See, e.g., J. MILLS THORNTON III, DIVIDING LINES: MUNICIPAL POLITICS AND THE
STRUGGLE FOR CIVIL RIGHTS IN MONTGOMERY, BIRMINGHAM, AND SELMA (2002).
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testify in support of the bill at a congressional hearing.)44 On the other
end of the ideological spectrum, some of the young radicals in the civil
rights community also had reservations about the Civil Rights Act.
SNCC chairman John Lewis had initially planned to attack the bill at
the March on Washington in August 1963 as insufficient because it
failed to address the plight of the black poor. Only under pressure
from March organizers did he temper some of his rhetoric and express
support for the Civil Rights Act.45
By identifying divisions within the black community over
school desegregation in the late 1960s and 1970s, Brown-Nagin is
responding to Derrick Bell’s influential 1976 article, Serving Two
Masters.46 Bell portrayed the NAACP’s insistence on pressing school
desegregation, despite opposition by poorer blacks, as a product of its
alliance with middle-class blacks.47 Brown-Nagin makes a powerful
critique of Bell’s conclusions, which simply do not hold up in the
context of Atlanta.48 While the intraracial fissures that Bell identified
certainly existed, Brown-Nagin demonstrates that in Atlanta the
dynamic was precisely reversed: poorer African Americans placed
more hope in aggressive enforcement of desegregation suits, while
middle-class blacks were more willing to work for advantages (such as
more positions for black teachers and administrators) within the
existing system of segregated schools. This exceptionally interesting
and important point demonstrates that the fault lines dividing the
African-American community on the most basic civil rights issues
often ran in unexpected directions.
C. Class and Gender in the Civil Rights Movement
A focus on the understudied intersections of class, gender, and
race marks another contribution of Courage to Dissent. A theme
throughout the book, class and racial divisions emerge in particularly
sharp form in the third section, when, in the 1970s, a coalition of poor
black women and social-welfare activists takes on Atlanta’s black
establishment. The challengers were led by Ethel Mae Mathews, who
was raised in an Alabama sharecropping family. After relocating to
44. BROWN-NAGIN, supra note 5, at 225.
45. Id. at 226–27.
46. Derrick A. Bell, Jr., Serving Two Masters: Integration Ideals and Client Interests in
School Desegregation Litigation, 85 YALE L.J. 470 (1976).
47. Id. at 489–92.
48. See BROWN-NAGIN, supra note 5, chs. 11–12; see also Tomiko Brown-Nagin, Race as
Identity Caricature: A Local Legal History Lesson in the Salience of Intraracial Conflict, 151 U.
PA. L. REV. 1913, 1924–28 (2003) (disputing Bell’s thesis as applied to Atlanta).
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Atlanta, she became a mother of five, worked as a maid, and went on
to become a welfare-rights activist. Her poverty defined her every bit
as much as her race: “The experience of moving from a rural to an
urban area, and of negotiating the city and an invasive welfare
bureaucracy after enduring the injustices of Jim Crow in Alabama,
had toughened her,” Brown-Nagin writes.49 She targeted anyone who
used power to shortchange the interests of the poor, regardless of race.
The book charts her fight for more aggressive school desegregation,
which she and her allies felt was the best way to secure resources and
opportunity for the poorest of black Atlantans. In contrast, local black
political leaders felt that the interests of the black professional class
were better served by prioritizing black political power, including
administrative control over local schools, even if this meant less school
integration. Thus, an intraracial battle over the core civil rights issue
of school desegregation took shape along class lines.
One person who took up Mathews’s struggle was the lawyer
Margie Pitts Hames, who spearheaded Armour v. Nix,50 an aggressive
and innovative lawsuit against segregated schools throughout the
Atlanta region. Her work with the mostly female plaintiffs
demonstrates the key role of gender, alongside class and race, in the
third phase of the civil rights struggle in Atlanta. A white woman who
was raised in poverty, Hames experienced various episodes—including
flagrant sex discrimination as a lawyer—that steered her toward
progressive views on issues of race and gender. She became an
attorney for the American Civil Liberties Union and dedicated herself
to feminist and civil rights issues. Prior to coming to Atlanta to
litigate the school case, she successfully argued Doe v. Bolton,51 the
companion case to Roe v. Wade.52 Hames saw similarities between her
work in Atlanta and her abortion work: both sought to protect the
interests of women whose life choices had been constrained by poverty
and government policy. The courtroom battle set Hames and her
mostly female group of plaintiffs against a team of white male lawyers
representing the city and suburban school districts. (Hames was
seeking a metropolitan-wide desegregation order). At trial, the school
board’s lawyers focused on the plaintiffs’ sex, race, and class as a way
to delegitimize their legal claim. They questioned the plaintiffs about
their marital status, whether they received welfare, and how many
children they had. The lawyers’ goal, Brown-Nagin explains, was to
49.
50.
51.
52.

BROWN-NAGIN, supra note 5, at 385.
446 U.S. 930 (1980) (per curiam).
410 U.S. 179 (1973).
410 U.S. 113 (1973).
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“underscore how different the plaintiffs were from traditional white
middle-class parents of school-age children.”53
In the end, this effort of poor black women to use the courts to
secure better schooling for their children failed—as did most
metropolitan desegregation claims—in the face of white flight and
legal limitations such as Milliken v. Bradley.54 Brown-Nagin draws
two quite different conclusions from the desegregation fight. On the
one hand, it shows “the potential agency of marginalized groups in
campaigns for change.”55 On the other hand, “Hames’s failed crusade
to redeem Brown revealed how challenging the struggle for social
justice had become in an era of federal court resignation to white
resistance to school desegregation and divergent black interests over a
range of public policy issues.”56 Although Courage to Dissent is hardly
overflowing with breakthrough victories, even the measured
achievements found in the first two phases of the long civil rights
movement are mostly absent in the final phase. When demands for
racial justice intersected with demands for economic justice, and when
the primary claimants were economically vulnerable women, as was
the case in Atlanta’s school-desegregation battles of the 1970s,
victories were rare. Simply having joined the battle, regardless of the
outcome, was an achievement.
III. WRITING HISTORIES OF SOCIAL REFORM AND LEGAL CHANGE
A. Three Approaches
In order to better understand the challenge of writing histories
of the intersection of social activism and formal legal change, I will
briefly describe the approaches of three notable legal-historical works
on the civil rights movement. Richard Kluger’s classic treatment of
Brown, Simple Justice, exemplifies the genre of narrative litigation
history. Michael Klarman’s From Jim Crow to Civil Rights presents
an approach in which the primary mechanisms of legal change are
broad historical processes rather than individuals. And Risa Goluboff’s
The Lost Promise of Civil Rights offers something of a middle-ground
approach in which lawyers act as imperfect intermediaries between
social activism and legal institutions. Examining the various ways in
which scholars have faced the challenge of writing about social
53. BROWN-NAGIN, supra note 5, at 414.
54. 418 U.S. 717, 744–45 (1974) (holding that courts cannot bus across districts to achieve
desegregation unless there is an “interdistrict violation and interdistrict effect”).
55. BROWN-NAGIN, supra note 5, at 428.
56. Id. at 429.
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movements and legal change offers some context with which to assess
the contributions of Brown-Nagin’s Courage to Dissent.
1. Litigation as Causal Narrative
Richard Kluger’s Simple Justice,57 published in 1976, is a
masterpiece of narrative history—engaging, accessible, and
exhaustively researched—and it makes no pretense of having any
kind of methodological or theoretical ambition. Kluger’s approach
assumes a direct and unproblematic connection between the demands
of African Americans and the remedies that courts are able to supply,
and in fact did supply in Brown. The book opens with a group of brave
African Americans in Clarendon County, South Carolina, coming
together, with the help of the NAACP, as plaintiffs in a lawsuit
challenging school segregation: “Their yearnings had been gathered
up and committed to paper and were being directed by able lawyers of
their own race to the courts of the government of the United States.”58
In Kluger’s account, the social experience of African Americans leads
to a lawsuit, which the lawyers pursue through the judicial system,
and, in the end, the Supreme Court responds. The Brown decision was
“nothing short of a reconsecration of American ideals”;59 it was “simple
justice.”60 Little to nothing, it seems, is lost as the issue moves from
social protest to legal suit to judicial opinion. The essence of the
wrong, racial segregation, becomes the target of the court-defined
remedy.
The effects of judicial doctrine are similarly direct. If the
NAACP lost Brown, Kluger writes, “[s]egregation would be reinforced
as the law of the land and the Negro’s yearning for equality might be
stifled for new generations.”61 When law fails to address social needs,
it is because of failures of empathy and will on the part of judges and
lawmakers. Limitations inherent in legal reform and legal institutions
are not at fault.
All of this makes for a dramatic and inspiring story, and it
certainly captures the highest hopes that many, both black and white,
put into Brown. Similar litigation-based frameworks, reliant on the

57.

RICHARD KLUGER, SIMPLE JUSTICE: THE HISTORY OF BROWN V. BOARD OF EDUCATION
(1976).
58. Id. at 25.
59. Id. at 710.
60. Id. Brown-Nagin has criticized Kluger for assuming “that all African-Americans
experienced subordination in exactly the same way, and thus were all sure to experience Brown
as a kind of salvation.” Brown-Nagin, Historical Note, supra note 6, at 996 n.21.
61. KLUGER, supra note 57, at 284.
AND BLACK AMERICA’S STRUGGLE FOR EQUALITY
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same kinds of assumed causal connections, are commonplace in the
legal-historical literature.62 But this approach also idealizes the
capacities of courts and legal remedies, marginalizes the possibility of
alternative approaches to achieving racial equality, and tends to
assume that all right-thinking African Americans were on board with
the NAACP’s litigation campaign—all points with which more recent
scholarship, including Courage to Dissent, takes sharp issue.
2. Zeitgeist as Cause and Constraint
A less idealistic and romanticized approach is on display in
Michael Klarman’s From Jim Crow to Civil Rights, a work that has
largely dislodged Simple Justice as the standard book on Brown.
Whereas Kluger emphasizes the role of lawyers and litigation in
forcing courts to confront the fundamental ills of society, Klarman is
skeptical of litigation as an independent causal mechanism for formal
legal change.63 What moves judges to change the law is not savvy legal
argumentation but changing social and cultural norms. The key
causal mechanism for legal development is the zeitgeist. “Judges are
part of contemporary culture, and they rarely hold views that deviate
far from dominant public opinion.”64 As a result, even seemingly
transformative Supreme Court rulings actually “reflected social
attitudes and practices more than they created them.”65
Not only are courts generally reflective of the broader political
environment, Klarman argues, but their capacity to change that
environment is far more circumscribed than scholars like Kluger
assume: “Because white supremacy depended less on law than on
entrenched social mores, economic power, ideology, and physical
violence, the amount of racial change that litigation could produce was
inevitably limited.”66 Court opinions can affect society, but their
influence is often indirect, unpredictable, ironic. The most obvious
impact of Brown, Klarman argues, was not to inspire black activism.

62. Classics in this genre include ANTHONY LEWIS, GIDEON’S TRUMPET (1964) and LOREN
MILLER, THE PETITIONERS: THE STORY OF THE SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES AND THE
NEGRO (1966).
63. See, e.g., KLARMAN, supra note 26, at 468 (“[D]eep background forces ensured that the
United States would experience a racial reform movement regardless of what the Supreme Court
did or did not do.”).
64. Id. at 6.
65. Id. at 443. Another recent work in the field that reflects similar assumptions about the
importance of the zeitgeist—in this case foreign-policy imperatives—in pressuring legal
institutions to reform civil rights policy is MARY L. DUDZIAK, COLD WAR CIVIL RIGHTS: RACE AND
THE IMAGE OF AMERICAN DEMOCRACY (2000).
66. KLARMAN, supra note 26, at 461.
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It was to inspire massive resistance, white backlash against civil
rights.67 Furthermore, its “indirect” effects should not be romanticized
or exaggerated:
[A]lthough Brown probably contributed to the belief among blacks that Jim Crow was
vulnerable, it did not foster the view that they could personally help to end it. Rather,
the high court’s ruling encouraged additional investment in litigation, as elite NAACP
lawyers tried to convince white judges to end segregation. Brown possibly discouraged
direct-action tactics, which had the capacity to enhance individual agency and to
generate transformative conflict.68

The end result of Klarman’s analysis is a portrait of the
Supreme Court as an institution deeply situated in a broader social
context and therefore limited in its ability (or willingness) to buck
public opinion. The Court is also limited in its ability to uproot
entrenched social practices. When it does make efforts in this
direction, unintended effects of the Court’s actions often complicate
matters for the intended beneficiaries.69
3. Legal Practice as Intermediary Mechanism
Another formulation of the law-society crossroads in the
context of civil rights history can be found in Risa Goluboff’s 2007
book, The Lost Promise of Civil Rights. Notably explicit in theorizing
the linkage between social activism and formal law, Goluboff describes
her book as “a study of how social phenomena become legal
problems.”70 The intermediary mechanism for this process of
translation is legal practice—the work of lawyers who respond to
concerns that citizens bring to them and then frame these concerns in
terms that courts and other formal legal institutions might respond to.
At the center of The Lost Promise of Civil Rights is the Civil Rights
Section of the Department of Justice and the NAACP’s legal
department in the 1940s. The process of law creation begins, in
Goluboff’s account, with letters from individuals requesting legal
assistance from the Justice Department or the NAACP. “Legal change
does not begin with the doctrines courts create or even the rhetorical
strategies lawyers employ,” she writes. “It begins with the injuries
individuals experience.”71 At that point, the work of lawyering
reshapes the complaint, responding to the “the interwoven legal,
67. See id. ch. 7; see also Michael J. Klarman, How Brown Changed Race Relations: The
Backlash Thesis, 81 J. AM. HIST. 81 (1994).
68. KLARMAN, supra note 26, at 380–81.
69. For an important survey of U.S. constitutional history that revolves around these basic
assumptions, see FRIEDMAN, supra note 2.
70. GOLUBOFF, supra note 41, at 6.
71. Id. at 5.
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political, and institutional cultures” in which lawyers work.72 Out of
this emerge what are hoped to be viable legal arguments.
The particular complaint-to-legal-argument process that
Goluboff highlights is the effort in the 1940s to forge a legal remedy to
the economic exploitation of black workers. This “lost” vision of civil
rights was centered on the intersection of race and labor interests and
often focused on remedies against private as well as state actors. It
included a belief in “collective labor rights to governmentally provided
economic security and affirmative rights to material and economic
equality.”73 Yet it was largely displaced in the 1950s by a conception of
civil rights that focused on discrimination by state actors. This was
the version of civil rights vindicated in Brown. By careful attention to
the experience of legal practice among government lawyers and civil
rights lawyers, Goluboff demonstrates the existence of a vision of civil
rights that has largely been marginalized in the legal and historical
literature.
As a general framework of analysis, Goluboff’s approach bears
some similarity to Kluger’s, in that both highlight the role of lawyer
elites in translating social demands into legal argument. Yet, whereas
Kluger assumes a one-to-one correlation between society and law, the
central theme of Goluboff’s book is the disconnect that often emerges
between social demands and legal response:
By the time a case reaches the Supreme Court, the complexities not only of social life
but also of the lawyering process itself have been winnowed into neat legal questions.
Those questions represent only a small slice of the social milieu and legal practice that
generated and nurtured the original complaint.74

This is the process of, as Goluboff nicely puts it, “doctrinal
distillation.”75 Far from Kluger’s portrayal of Brown as directly
responsive to a generalizable experience of racial oppression, Brown,
in Goluboff’s telling, was the end product of countless iterations of
translation and refinement. It responded only to “a partial and
particular image of Jim Crow.”76
B. Local People as Agents of Constitutional Change
How does Courage to Dissent fit with this other scholarship
that has sought to explain the place of law in responding to and
instigating social change? As important as the book is in the field of
72.
73.
74.
75.
76.

Id. at 13.
Id. at 5.
Id. at 238.
Id.
Id. at 251.
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legal history, and as considerable its theoretical implications, this is
not a particularly easy question to answer, because Brown-Nagin
insistently avoids overarching claims about the role of law and courts
in social-movement mobilization. The book’s clearest “big claim” is an
anticlaim: it is Brown-Nagin’s critique of historians and legal scholars
who attempt to make big causal claims. Its most sweeping
pronouncement is a denunciation of sweeping pronouncements: “There
should be no grand, absolutist theories about courts, lawyers, and
social change.”77 In Brown-Nagin’s view, generalizations about law
and social change necessarily marginalize local stories. Attention to
localized experiences introduces ambiguity and complexity and
contradictions, all of which undermine grand historical arguments.
Once one understands “how social movements actually evolved over
time in real communities,”78 no broad claims of law and social change
can survive.
Thus, the conclusion that Brown-Nagin draws from her study
of Atlanta and the civil rights movement is that there are few—and
perhaps no—predictable patterns when it comes to the interplay
between social activism and the legal system. “Court action both
mobilized and demobilized the civil rights movement.”79 The moving
parts were always shifting; “the relationship between the courts, civil
rights litigation, and activists was dynamic.”80 “Upon engaging in a
bottom-up historical analysis—featuring local lawyers, activists,
clients, and organizations, alongside more traditional repositories of
legal power—an incredibly complex picture emerges.”81
An argument for complexity is most effective when framed as
critique. Any historian who spends time in interdisciplinary settings
has likely had the following experience: A nonhistorian presents some
samplings of historical material and then makes an interesting and
sweeping conclusion from that material. The historian responds, in so
many words, “But it’s more complex than that!” Others in the
audience nod sympathetically and then continue trying to fine-tune
their preferred theory to explain the material. For those who have
been critical of much recent legal and political-science scholarship on
law and social movements, Brown-Nagin’s insistence on context and
complexity is going to be welcome indeed.82 For those who prefer
77. BROWN-NAGIN, supra note 5, at 434.
78. Id.
79. Id. at 250.
80. Id. at 174.
81. Id. at 84.
82. See, e.g., Kenneth W. Mack, Law and Local Knowledge in the History of the Civil Rights
Movement, 125 HARV. L. REV. 1018, 1020 (2012) (reviewing BROWN-NAGIN, supra note 5) (“It is
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historical inquiry to result in some generalizable conclusions, some
broadly applicable theory of law and social change, her resistance to
this kind of theorizing may be seen as a limitation.83
Rather than relying on an overarching causal claim about law
or courts, Courage to Dissent revolves around a central theme, namely
Brown-Nagin’s belief in the ability of local actors to shape the world in
which they live, including its legal rules. Contra the arguments of
those who view litigation as demobilizing for social movements,84
Brown-Nagin demonstrates that litigation can often serve as a focal
point for grassroots activism: “[L]egal and political approaches to
pursuing equality were not incompatible.”85 The book includes chapter
and section titles like “Local People as Agents of Constitutional
Change” and “How Do Citizens Shape Law?” To say that ordinary
people have agency is to say that, to some extent, they can affect the
social, political, economic, and legal structures in which they live. If
we think in terms of the basic challenge of writing socio-legal history,
these claims of bottom-up agency serve as the connective tissue
linking the world of everyday people with the dynamics of formal legal
change.
How exactly does a local actor become an agent of
constitutional change? Brown-Nagin suggests two dynamics at play.
One, involving the enforcement of legal norms, offers a fully
persuasive account of bottom-up agency in action. Ordinary people can
exert considerable resistance to law when it does not align with their
own beliefs and experiences: “In the end, local people determine

precisely [its] appreciation for complexity that constitutes the greatest strength of Courage to
Dissent, in a field where broad, thesis-driven narratives have dominated the debate.”).
83. Brown-Nagin has engaged in some level of descriptive theorizing in her previous work.
For example, in her 2005 Columbia Law Review article, “Elites, Social Movements, and the Law:
The Case of Affirmative Action,” she examines the litigation and activism surrounding the
Supreme Court’s rulings in the Michigan affirmative action cases of 2003, Grutter v. Bollinger,
539 U.S. 306 (2003), and Gratz v. Bollinger, 539 U.S. 244 (2003). She concludes that social
movements—defined as “politically insurgent and participatory campaigns for relief from
socioeconomic crisis or the redistribution of social, political, and economic capital”—“are
generally incompatible with constitutional litigation.” Brown-Nagin, Elites, supra note 6, at 1439
(citation omitted). One of the key contributions of this article is to emphasize the different ways
in which constitutional law and the rights-centered discourse it encourages can hinder social
movement mobilization. A focus on rights can offer a powerful, inspirational focal point for
mobilization. But it can also hem in mobilization efforts, for “social movements that define
themselves through law in the courts risk undermining their insurgent role in the political
process, thus losing their agenda-setting ability.” Id. at 1443. Courage to Dissent seems to offer a
more optimistic, if still measured, appraisal of the potential for a symbiotic relationship between
social-movement mobilization and court-centered reform.
84. E.g., ROSENBERG, supra note 26.
85. BROWN-NAGIN, supra note 5, at 208.
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whether constitutional rules are accepted and implemented.”86 This
observation is similar to Klarman’s claim regarding the limited
capacity of courts to affect commitments that are embedded in society.
Klarman emphasizes this argument by pointing to the judiciary’s
limitations in forcing racial equality upon whites committed to white
supremacy.87 Brown-Nagin demonstrates that whites were not the
only ones able to resist legal mandates. Blacks were also able to shape
(within limits) the implementation of top-down legal reform. When the
NAACP and, after 1954, the Supreme Court called for school
integration, black Atlantans found ways to leverage white resistance
so as to steer resources to black schools. In this way, Brown-Nagin
argues, “local people in Atlanta shaped what meaning Brown would
have.”88 The ways in which top-down legal developments were
leveraged and resisted on the local level is an undeniably important
instance of legal agency outside formal legal institutions.
Brown-Nagin’s other agency dynamic is a more standard claim
for bottom-up legal change. It involves social activists whom she
credits with pressuring official legal institutions to change the law.
Here, local people act as what Brown-Nagin describes as “law
makers.”89 On this count, some of the book’s arguments, while
suggestive and plausible, are underdeveloped. Lines of connection feel
strained in places, with causal claims reliant on underexamined
assumptions. Take, for example, Brown-Nagin’s identification of the
1964 Civil Rights Act as an instance in which there was a direct link
between local activism and constitutional change.90 The argument
here is quite simple: civil rights protests in Atlanta led Mayor Allen to
accept the need for federal intervention, and Allen’s support played a
key role in the passage of the landmark federal civil rights law.91 But
86. Id. at 403.
87. See, e.g., KLARMAN, supra note 26, at 461 (“Because white supremacy depended less on
law than on entrenched social mores, economic power, ideology, and physical violence, the
amount of racial change that litigation could produce was inevitably limited.”).
88. BROWN-NAGIN, supra note 5, at 109.
89. Id. at 7, 431.
90. I fully accept the implication here that the passage of the Civil Rights Act marked not
only an expansion of federal civil rights law, but also a basic change for American
constitutionalism. See Ernest A. Young, The Constitution Outside the Constitution, 117 YALE L.J.
408 (2007); see also Christopher W. Schmidt, The Sit-Ins and the State Action Doctrine, 18 WM. &
MARY BILL RTS. J. 767, 802–23 (2010) (discussing constitutional debate over the passage of the
Civil Rights Act of 1964); Rebecca E. Zeitlow, To Secure These Rights: Congress, Courts and the
1964 Civil Rights Act, 57 RUTGERS L. REV. 945 (2005) (same).
91. See BROWN-NAGIN, supra note 5, at 247–48 (“President Kennedy turned to Ivan Allen
to break the congressional logjam that impeded enactment of a strong civil rights law precisely
because of Atlanta’s symbolic importance. Protests . . . played a causal role in Allen’s embrace of
federal intervention. Hence, the Atlanta demonstrations indirectly pushed Congress toward
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to really make this point would require attention not only to activists
on the ground, and not only to Mayor Allen’s strategizing, but also to
those people who were directly responsible for the Civil Rights Act—
members of Congress, the Kennedy and Johnson administrations,
leading opinionmakers—who might have been influenced by the
mayor’s support (or by the local protests). This becomes tricky terrain,
of course, as major legal transformations quickly come to appear
hopelessly complex and overdetermined, making vulnerable any
narrow causal claims.92 Nonetheless, some inquiry into the question,
or at least reference to other work that has examined the question,
would seem required to make a compelling case for agency, if agency is
to be defined as influence on legal change at an institutional level.
Agency may be demonstrated in ways other than by influencing
formal policy or law, of course. Brown-Nagin argues that speaking out
against oppression, organizing citizens, and participating in public
debate all are indications of the agency of everyday people. Defined in
this way, examples of agency can be readily located—Courage to
Dissent is filled with them. The question then becomes whether this
rather thin definition—one in which agency appears practically
everywhere if one is looking for it—is all that helpful. Consider the
argument Brown-Nagin offers for the achievements of local welfarerights activists who fought alongside NAACP lawyers to try to secure
a strong school-desegregation decree in the 1970s. They lost their
lawsuit, Brown-Nagin notes, yet they “achieved a measure of
satisfaction simply by identifying how they were wronged and by
asserting rights in court.”93 This is a critically important point: to call
power to account is certainly an indispensible element in the exercise
of agency. From the perspective of the actors themselves, the act of
resistance is paramount. But to say that resistance alone shows
agency—without demonstrating from a more generalizable, systemic
perspective that some change actually occurred as a result—seems a
narrow and not particularly useful conception of agency. To show
ordinary people acting as agents of change would seem to require
showing the changes that can be attributed, directly or indirectly, to
their actions.

passage of the 1964 Civil Rights Act. Contrary to the claims of the Act’s sponsors, civil
disobedience did help to bring equal protection under the laws.”).
92. Consider the ink spilled over the causes of the “Constitutional Revolution of 1937.” See,
e.g., Symposium, The Debate over the Constitutional Revolution of 1937, 110 AM. HIST. REV.
1046, 1046–1115 (2005); Symposium, Twentieth-Century Constitutional History, 80 VA. L. REV. 1,
201–90 (1994).
93. BROWN-NAGIN, supra note 5, at 428.
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All of this is offered less as a critique of the book’s reliance on
agency as an analytical tool for connecting grassroots activism and
legal change than as a commentary on how truly challenging it is to
make this connection. Once we abandon simplistic assumptions that
there are direct lines of causation from protest to Supreme Court
doctrine, we are left with the hard work of demonstrating on a more
fine-grained level the intersections along the many stages of the
society-law continuum. Our focus must necessarily be narrowed. At
the center of Klarman’s inquiry are the Justices of the Supreme Court;
at the center of Goluboff’s are elite attorneys; and at the center of
Brown-Nagin’s are community activists and lawyers. These are
choices, all perfectly defensible to my mind, but they necessarily limit
the scope of persuasive historical argument.
C. Dissent, Activism, and Legal Change
One of the conclusions Brown-Nagin draws from her history is
that dissent is the lifeblood of successful social-movement activism:
At crucial points, the movement benefited from the conflict that percolated—sometimes
intensely—among the NAACP, LDF, and local civil rights groups. Even when conflict
did not produce immediate benefits, dissenters pointed out flaws in dominant
approaches. . . . [T]he friction between and among lawyers and political activists over
ideology and methods often energized the civil rights movement in Atlanta.94

Dissent—and its correlative, democracy—is good not only for society
at large, but also as an organizing principle for groups dedicated to
reforming society. The civil rights movement was most effective when
it drew in a larger number of voices, not only because it had wider
support, but also because it took into account a broader array of
issues, particularly those of the black working class.95 Pragmatists
were forced to accept more aggressive and confrontational techniques
and a more sweeping critique of Jim Crow; NAACP civil rights
lawyers were pressured to play a more supportive role in direct-action
protest; and student radicals benefited from being required to
“modulate their protests in ways consistent with lawyers’ tactical
objectives.”96 Brown-Nagin celebrates a “legal culture that . . . was
open to goals and approaches developed by local citizens out of the
clash of ideas and political dissensus.”97
Of course, dissent and democracy in social movements can cut
both ways, as Brown-Nagin acknowledges. For those dedicated to
94.
95.
96.
97.

Id. at 432.
See, e.g., id. at 173–74 (discussing impact of student activists on the movement).
Id. at 174.
Id. at 441.
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mobilization and legal change, dissent is often precisely what they
want to avoid. Consider, for example, the NAACP as it pursued its
school-litigation campaign. As Brown-Nagin well documents,
ambivalence, even outright opposition, to school-desegregation
litigation was widespread within the black community throughout the
period leading up to Brown and in the years immediately following.
For this reason, one of the unrecognized achievements of the NAACP
was to rally black skeptics and neutralize those who refused to go
along. Thurgood Marshall and his legal team certainly knew the
extent of resistance, but they dismissed this particular dissenting
voice as illegitimate. Marshall “had no patience for uncertainty about
school desegregation,” Brown-Nagin writes.98 He dismissed black
opponents as accommodationists, as people who were too beaten down
and too fearful to stand up for their constitutional rights. This was a
deeply unfair characterization, and one of the great contributions of
Courage to Dissent is to give sympathetic (while not uncritical)
attention to those who embraced this particular strand of intraracial
dissent.
The interesting question is whether Thurgood Marshall and his
colleagues were necessarily wrong for forging ahead in this instance.
To make a compelling case before the court of public opinion and the
U.S. Supreme Court, Marshall portrayed the issue as one of simple
justice. Not only was the wrongness of racial segregation obvious, but
so was the solution. It was a top-down, federally enforced mandate to
end segregation as soon as possible. The obviousness of this solution
would have been undermined if the considerable dissent within the
black community on the question of remedies was given the respectful
hearing that it perhaps deserved.99
Similar questions arose in the later eras that Brown-Nagin
describes. The direct-action phase of the movement in the early 1960s
was effective not only when dissenting voices were heard, but also
when there was a general consensus on key issues of targets and
tactics. Dissent energized the civil rights community by introducing
new and powerful ways of undermining segregation. But dissent also
pulled valuable alliances apart—a fact that the student movement

98. Id. at 108.
99. Marshall’s actions here do not come off well in Brown-Nagin’s account. See, e.g., id. at
102 (“Marshall and his staff barreled ahead with the direct assault, convinced of its rightness,
working on the assumption that local people who might disagree would eventually bend to LDF’s
will.”).

Schmidt_PAGE.docx (Do Not Delete)

182

8/1/12 4:26 PM

VANDERBILT LAW REVIEW EN BANC

[Vol. 65:155

experienced with particularly disillusioning consequences in the midand late 1960s.100
Dissent is a powerful theme for Brown-Nagin because it
highlights the intergenerational conflicts and intraracial tensions that
stand out among the book’s most innovative elements. Assuming for
the sake of argument that such things can be asserted with any level
of accuracy, perhaps, on balance, voices of dissent did more to
strengthen than to weaken civil rights activism.101 But perhaps here is
another place to insert the historian’s plea for complexity. Dissent
(like litigation) can be generative and empowering, and (like litigation)
it can work in precisely the opposite manner.
When it comes to the value of dissent to protest movements, I
suspect that Brown-Nagin abandons her resistance to broad claims
because voicing dissent remains such a vital weapon for the powerless.
And if there is one constant in her book’s dynamic, complex historical
account, it is the marginalization of the interests of the black working
class. This marginalization was “a remarkable point of convergence
among lawyers and activists for racial change.”102 To champion the
cause of poor and working-class African Americans, as Brown-Nagin
clearly does, is to champion the weapon that no amount of repression
or inattention can take away. When there is a stable consensus across
generational and racial lines that minimizes the needs of poor blacks,
dissent serves a constant role in challenging this consensus.
CONCLUSION
Courage to Dissent is quite simply the best legal history of the
civil rights movement. Although centered on Atlanta, it offers the
most comprehensive account of movement mobilization and legal
change in the civil rights era in the scholarship today. No other legal
scholar has gone as far in telling the story of the movement on such a
grand scale. Brown-Nagin captures the complex dynamics of activism,
intraracial tension, generational conflict, and legal mobilization as
they unfolded over four decades. She draws attention to class and
gender conflict as central factors in the long civil rights movement.
She brings to the foreground a large cast of African-American men
100. See, e.g., id. at 300 (describing 1966 as spawning “a maelstrom of dissent within the
civil rights movement”).
101. Perhaps the value of dissent varies over the life cycle of social-movement mobilization.
It clearly serves a critical role in the early, formative stages, when dissenting claims serve to
define and unify a movement’s mission. But at later stages dissent within a movement often
functions as a key factor in its dissolution.
102. BROWN-NAGIN, supra note 5, at 434.
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and women—a few familiar names and many less familiar, lawyers
and nonlawyers, some from relatively privileged backgrounds and
some raised dirt poor—and presents them as the primary agents of
legal change. This is a compelling and challenging book. That it does
not fully resolve all the questions it raises is, as this Essay has sought
to demonstrate, a testament to its ambition and to the difficulties
inherent in writing persuasive legal histories of social movements.
Brown-Nagin’s book stands as one of the small number of essential
texts in the field of modern American legal history.

